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Changes 
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Stern School of Business, Department of Finance 
We formulate and test several hypotheses on managerial motivation using 
organizational form changes in the real estate industry. We find that firms that switch to a 
more restrictive structure have increases in stock value and managerial ownership. Firms 
moving to a less restrictive structure have larger wealth effects when higher monitoring exists. 
Higher degree of financial distress and forced CEO replacement at the time of organizational 
form change are taken to be proxies for higher degree of (creditor) monitoring. The wealth 
effects are decreasing in the firm’s level of free cash flow at the time of organizational form 
change. 
Introduction 
The modern agency literature has developed into two strands depending on the source of the 
managerial agency problems. An extensive literature follows Jensen and Meckling (1976), focusing on 
the relatively small ownership of cash flow claims by the manager as the source of distortions in 
managerial actions, such as excessive consumption of perks, underinvestment or shirking. A second 
strand emphasizes managers’ private benefits of control (e.g., see Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). The 
benefits of control are only available to the manager and cannot be contracted away to other 
shareholders. Examples of such control benefits are management perquisites, synergy with other firms 
run by the same management, returns to firm-specific investment in human capital, reputation effects 
arising from successfully managing the firm, etc. In general, the higher the degree of managerial 
discretion, the greater are the benefits of control. For example, a project or a firm with large amounts of 
free cash flow (Stulz, 1990) might allow large benefits of control. Control benefits create incentives for 
management to distort investments deviating from value-maximizing levels. The relative importance of 
private benefits of control and the value of their cash flow claims in motivating managers is an empirical 
question of central importance in corporate governance. 
The purpose of our study is to examine how managers choose among the organizational forms 
that provide them with different degrees of discretion. Based on a careful examination of the contracts, 
which define the different organizational forms, we categorize changes among organizational forms into 
two classes; those that decrease and those that increase managerial discretion. Given this 
characterization of changes in organizational form that the manager initiates, we can examine the 
relative importance of managerial discretion and the value of their cash flow claims in motivating 
managers. Using a model of this trade-off between managerial discretion and the value of their cash 
flow claims, we formulate several testable hypotheses on changes in organizational form. 
All else constant, a change into a tighter organizational form should decrease agency costs and 
increase overall shareholder value. However, since managerial discretion goes down with such a change, 
it may not be in the interest of the managers to initiate this change. If the manager holds a large fraction 
of equity in the firm, then the gain in the value of his cash flow claims might offset the reduction in his 
private benefits of control. Since changes into a tighter organizational form reduce managerial discretion 
and the managerial benefits of control, management would propose such changes only if they are 
accompanied by large increases in the value of managers’ equity claims. This implies that changes to 
more restrictive organizational forms should be accompanied by increases in shareholder value. 
Moreover, such changes are more likely when the manager’s ownership of equity and options are high. 
Similarly, since changes into a looser organizational structure increase managerial discretion, 
they lead to an increase in agency cost and, hence, a reduction in shareholder value. These agency costs 
are aggravated by the presence of free cash flows. In the case of a healthy firm with a large amount of 
free cash flow and no increase in the monitoring of management, these organizational form changes are 
value reducing for shareholders. 
On the other hand, if a distressed firm undertakes such organizational form changes, its wealth 
effects may be better than that of a healthy firm for the following reasons: (1) since the firm has low 
levels of free cash flow, the agency costs resulting from a looser organizational form would be low; (2) as 
the firm goes through different stages of financial distress, the extent of creditor monitoring may 
increase; and (3) the looser organizational form may provide additional flexibility required for 
restructuring the debt contract and thus reduce the cost of financial distress. These observations 
provide additional testable hypotheses about organizational form changes into a looser structure. 
Financially distressed firms that are moving into a looser organizational form should have more positive 
wealth effects relative to healthy firms. In general, the wealth effects of moving into a looser 
organizational form should decrease in the level of free cash flow that the firm has at the time of 
organizational form change. 
Changes into a looser organizational form accompanied by increased monitoring of managers 
may involve less agency cost compared to those where there is no increased monitoring of managers. 
One manifestation of increased managerial monitoring may be the willingness of the board to replace 
managers who have either performed poorly in the past or have a high taste for benefits of control. In 
either case, changes into looser organizational forms accompanied by managerial replacement may 
involve smaller agency costs than those without managerial replacement. This suggests that the 
organizational form changes to a looser structure should have more positive wealth effects when 
accompanied by managerial replacement than otherwise. 
We examine a sample of 134 changes among different organizational forms in the real estate 
industry. We look at real estate investment trusts (REITs), which pay no taxes but accept significant 
restrictions on investment policy. In addition, the legally mandated requirement that the firm pay out 
95% of its taxable earnings to shareholders significantly limits the free cash flow under managerial 
control. We also examine the traditional corporate form, which allows much greater freedom to make 
investment and dividend decisions but at the significant cost of double taxation. In between these two 
extremes, there are organizational forms, such as master limited partnerships (MLPs), and business 
trusts that share some characteristics with both REITs and corporations.1 
An overview of our empirical results follows. We examine the announcement effect of different 
organizational form changes that change managerial discretion and document the degree of managerial 
alignment with stockholders. To examine the intensity of this alignment, we determine the percentage 
of stock held by insiders in the firm and the fraction of management compensation related to the stock 
price (primarily management warrants). Insider ownership in those firms that are moving to a tighter 
structure (27.81%) is significantly higher than it is in firms moving to a looser structure (10.93%). The 
warrant component in management compensation in firms moving to a tighter structure (23.47%) is also 
significantly higher relative to firms moving to a looser structure (5.71%). Since managerial discretion 
                                                          
1 Much of the traditional discussion of these different organizational forms emphasizes their differences in tax 
structure and dividend policy. For example, Moore et al. (1989) investigate MLPs formed by a total conversion of 
corporate assets and a rolling-out of subsets of those assets and document a significant positive announcement 
effect. We look at these organizational forms in the context of managerial discretion. We characterize 
organizational form changes by firms moving into a looser or tighter structure, i.e., increasing or decreasing 
managerial discretion. For example, the REIT structure, with its restriction on investment and dividend policy, 
curtails managerial discretion and, hence, their private benefits of control. At the other extreme, corporations, 
with their looser constraints on investment and dividend policy, cede more discretion to managers. 
and managerial benefits of control decrease with changes into a tighter organizational form, it is the 
increase in the value of the cash flow claims that motivates managers to initiate such changes. 
On the date the board approves an organizational form change to a tighter structure, the stock 
price increases by 4.71% over a Day -5 to +5 window.2 The larger holding of equity-aligned claims by 
managers of firms that move into a tighter structure and the positive and significant wealth effects on 
the announcement of changes into a tighter organizational form are consistent with our hypotheses. 
Changes to a looser organizational form increase managerial discretion and benefits of control. 
Managers could be willing to initiate such changes whether or not they are accompanied by increases in 
shareholder wealth. However, the value loss from managerial agency costs is smaller if the 
organizational form change is accompanied by increased monitoring of managers either by creditors or 
the board of directors. 
Whether or not a firm is in financial distress provides us with a measure of the degree of control 
and monitoring by the creditors. Based on a number of relevant criteria, we classify the firms into those 
that are healthy and those that are in financial distress. To measure board monitoring, we explore 
whether or not stockholders exercise their right to replace the incumbent management of the firm. 
Among the firms moving to a looser structure, we expect to find a higher wealth effect among the 
financially distressed firms and the firms where managers are replaced at the time of the organizational 
change. 
In our sample, the announcement effect of firms moving into a looser organizational form is 
positive and significant (2.84%).We also find that the wealth effects are larger for distressed firms 
moving to a looser structure (4.23%) compared to healthy firms (1.97%). The cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) during 2 years prior to the organizational change of 22.07% goes to a postchange of 3.6% 
for healthy firms and from -58.19% to 4.1% for distressed firms. This evidence is consistent with our 
hypotheses regarding increased managerial monitoring in firms going through financial distress and the 
value of the flexibility of the looser organizational form in mitigating financial distress cost. We also 
document that the wealth effects for healthy firms moving into a looser organizational structure is 
declining in the level of free cash flow at the time of the organizational change. This is also consistent 
with our hypotheses relating agency costs and free cash flow. 
We compare the wealth effects of healthy firms moving to a looser organizational structure with 
and without replacement of the incumbent management. We find that the stock price change is more 
                                                          
2 The date the board approves an organizational form change is the earliest public announcement. The exact 
sequence of events following the board approval in which the firm’s creditors and shareholders vote on the 
proposed change is described in Section 5.2. 
positive for firms where incumbent management is replaced around the time of the organizational 
change. More specifically, the announcement effect 4 A. Damodaran et al. / Journal of Corporate 
Finance 12 (2005) 1–26 for these organizational form changes without managerial replacement of 1.14% 
is significantly lower than the announcement effect with managerial replacement of 7.16%. When we 
further categorize firms into those where the management change precedes the change in 
organizational form and those where it follows the change, we find that the positive excess returns are 
almost entirely concentrated in firms where the management is replaced prior to the organizational 
form change. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review of related literature. In 
Section 3, we present the institutional description of the different organizational forms along with the 
restrictions associated with the contracts defining the organization form. In Section 4, we also present 
the hypotheses and testable implications for the trade-off between managerial discretion and 
managerial cash flow claims determining the organizational form change. In Section 5, we describe the 
sample and illustrate the impact that organizational form changes have on stock price. Section 6 
concludes. 
Related Literature 
In a modern corporation, stockholders and other outside investors delegate decision-making 
authority to managers. Managers, as the agents of stockholders, are charged with making decisions that 
enhance the wealth of the stockholders. Although stockholders supply the capital, they have only 
limited influence over the corporation’s activities, which are primarily under the control of the 
management. In the U.S., management typically owns a small fraction of the cash flow claims of the 
firm. The agency problems caused by this separation of ownership and control (or finance and 
management) and the mechanisms of corporate governance to reduce it have been the subject of 
extensive research that began with Berle and Means (1932).3 
The theoretical and empirical literature has examined mechanisms that mitigate agency 
problems. These mechanisms can be broadly categorized into two classes. One class examines means to 
align the incentives of managers with those of stockholders.4 Managerial ownership of stocks and 
                                                          
3 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and John and Senbet (1998). 
4 Various mechanisms have been studied that align stockholder and managerial interest, thereby mitigating agency 
costs (see Byrd et al., 1998 for a review of the literature). These mechanisms include equity-based devices, such as 
stock ownership, which tends to increase management costs of shirking and excessive asset use, although Stulz 
(1988) shows that problems exist if ownership is too large; incentive compensation (stock options), which shifts 
options and incentive features in the managerial compensation structure that increase sensitivity of 
managerial wealth to firm performance (such as bonus plans and managerial dismissals for poor 
performance) are examples. 
The second class of mechanisms involves increased monitoring of managers and the use of the 
additional information generated in contracting with and disciplining the manager.5 The idea here is to 
limit the distortions arising from managerial discretion and managers’ preference for private benefits of 
control by using contractual and disciplinary mechanisms. Examples of contractual mechanisms include 
managerial contracts that specify particular actions for managers, restrictive debt covenants that 
constrain managerial actions and organizational form contracts which reduce managerial discretion. 
Increased monitoring by a board (and activist large investors) or creditor monitoring (during financial 
distress) that lead to managerial dismissals also represent mechanisms that reduce the expected value 
of managerial benefits of control. 
There is some empirical evidence on the value of aligning managers with shareholders. 
Increasing the amount of stock owned by managers is the most direct method of aligning the interest of 
managers with those of shareholders. A number of empirical studies of US corporations document a 
positive relation between managerial stock ownership and firm performance. However, the relation is 
not monotonic (e.g., see Morck et al., 1988, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990). This evidence is consistent with that of Stulz (1988), who showed that high level of stock 
ownership by managers can accentuate conflicts between stockholders and managers. Managers can 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the risk preference of management toward stockholders; and punitive devices, such as firing incumbent managers. 
Other mechanisms that are particularly relevant to our paper is the argument of Jensen (1986) that firms with high 
levels of debt and dividend tend to have reduced agency costs. Although dividends tend to be discretionary, for 
the case of real estate investment trusts (REITs), REITs must pay out 95% of taxable income. As such, REITs must 
constantly go back to the capital market to finance growth. 
5 Prior theoretical literature has examined the structure of contracts and the associated agency problems in 
determining the choice of organizational forms (see Alchian, 1950; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983b) emphasize the role of the control of agency problems as a major 
determinant of the structure of organizations. For a survey of the literature in this area, see Jensen and Smith 
(1985) and Barnea et al. (1985). Allen and Winton (1994) survey the design of financial contracts. Although there 
has been some theoretical analysis of agency considerations in organizational choice, little empirical work on the 
topic exists. Brickley and Dark (1987) present evidence that the cost of monitoring store managers is an important 
determinant of the choice between owning (operating centrally) and franchising. Other papers that determine 
related issues are Mayers and Smith (1981), Masulis (1987) and Karpoff and Rice (1989). Mayers and Smith 
examine common stock to mutual conversions in the life insurance industry based on a sample of 30 firms. Masulis 
examines mutual savings and loans that switch to a stock charter. Karpoff and Rice study 13 corporations 
established under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA). These corporations have many 
organizational restrictions, the most important of which is that stock cannot be traded. 
insulate themselves from the firms’ monitoring and governance mechanisms and from external 
disciplinary forces, such as the takeover market. 
In contrast, empirical evidence on the relation between managerial discretion, related 
managerial benefits of control and firm performance has been relatively scarce. Some important 
evidence exists that relates firm performance and free cash flow. For example, Lang et al. (1989) show 
that bidder returns on the announcement of tender offers decrease in the amount of free cash flow that 
the bidders have. More recently, Ang et al. (2000) find that increased creditor monitoring lowers agency 
costs. However, direct empirical tests relating managerial discretion and managerial decisions have been 
difficult because it is hard to quantify managerial discretion in specific projects. In this paper, we order 
the managerial discretion available in the different organizational forms and study the motivation of 
managers in choosing among them. 
Institutional Background 
In this section, we describe the characteristics of real estate investment trusts, master limited 
partnerships, business trusts and real estate corporations. 
Differences between Organizational Forms 
The real estate organizational forms examined in this study differ in three major areas. 
Structure of Taxation (Single versus Double Taxation) 
Single taxation is a characteristic of REITs and MLPs since both are taxed at the investor level but 
not at the firm level. This tax benefit is given to REITs to compensate for certain investment and 
dividend policy restrictions to which REITs must adhere. MLPs receive single-taxation status only if they 
invest in certain activities, such as real estate or oil and gas. Otherwise, for tax purposes, MLPs are 
treated as a corporation. This tax advantage does not exist for business trusts and corporations that are 
taxed at both the entity level on income and at the investor level on dividends. 
Restrictions on Investment and Dividend Policy (More Restrictive to Less Restrictive) 
The tax code requires REITs to distribute 95% of their taxable income to shareholders, which 
effectively limits REITs’ use of internal financing. Consequently, REITs must return to the capital markets 
on a regular basis, which in turn tends to impart discipline and monitoring. 
The code further requires that a minimum of 75% of a REIT’s gross income must come from real 
estate. A REIT must also be a passive investment conduit; that is, less than 30% of a REIT’s income must 
come from the operation of real estate held less than 4 years and income from the sale of securities 
held less than 1 year. REITs cannot engage in active real estate operations. They cannot operate a 
business, develop or trade properties for sale or sell more than five properties per year. A REIT is 
prohibited from entering into tax-free exchanges to acquire properties. To ensure the passive nature of 
REITs, the tax code had required REITs to use independent contractors to manage properties. This direct 
management restriction was removed in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 
Although no dividend payout restrictions exist for MLPs, a high payout ratio is likely since 
partners are taxed regardless of whether they actually receive the income or the MLP retains it. This fact 
has to be weighed off against the investment opportunities of an MLP. The empirical evidence suggests 
that MLPs pay out a high proportion of their earnings as dividends. Although MLPs are restricted to 
engaging in real estate activities (or oil and gas), there are no restrictions on the nature or management 
of these activities. Consequently, MLPs can actively and directly engage in the real estate trade or 
business. There are no MLP restrictions on the number of properties that can be sold in any given year. 
Business trusts and corporations have no restrictions on dividend payout and can engage in any 
real estate or nonreal estate activity except those prohibited in the declaration of trust or corporate 
charter, respectively. 
Managerial Discretion over Cash Flows (Less to More Managerial Discretion) 
Because of the dividend payout requirements and investment policy restrictions associated with 
REITs (see Jensen, 1986), managers of REITs have less discretion over how they handle their cash flows 
relative to other real estate organizational forms. The flexibility afforded MLP managers is greater than 
that given managers of REITs since the partnership agreements of most MLPs specify only minimum 
cash payouts and do not mandate specific payout ratios (see Moore et al., 1989). Business trusts offer 
even more managerial flexibility on the disposition of cash flows. This flexibility is the result of the 
absence of payout restrictions. However, the managers of business trusts have unlimited liability for all 
debts of the trust. Managers of corporations have the most control over their cash flow options since 
there are no payout or investment restrictions. 
Categorizing Organizational Changes 
Based on these three dimensions, changes in organizational form are classified as moves to a 
looser structure or moves to a tighter structure. We classify the movement of a REIT to a business trust, 
a business trust to a corporation, REIT to a corporation, REIT to an MLP and a finite REIT to MLP as shifts 
to a looser structure. We designate a shift from a corporation to either a REIT or MLP and a change from 
an MLP to a REIT as moves to a tighter structure.6 
Changes in organizational form change the entity-level tax status, the level of managerial 
discretion and the restrictions on investment and dividend policy. These changes can be mapped into 
either decreases or increases in managerial discretion (and hence managerial benefits of control). They 
can thus form the basis of some testable hypotheses that examine the trade-off between managerial 
discretion and compensation in motivating managers. 
Testable Hypotheses 
The trade-off between the change in managerial discretion and the change in managerial wealth 
that results from bonding and monitoring are important determinants of managerial motivation to 
initiate such changes. In general, managers trade off the change in value from an organizational form 
change against the change in managerial private benefits when deciding whether to move to a tighter or 
looser structure. Thus, managers who initiate a move to a tighter organization structure are trading 
some private benefits (because of restrictions that come with a tighter structure) for an increase in the 
value of their holdings that comes about from making the change. The greater the latter relative to the 
former, the more likely it is that they will initiate such a change. 
The trade-off between the private benefits of control and the value of managers’ cash flow 
claims provides us with several testable hypotheses. Since changes into a tighter organizational form or 
a more intensely monitored environment reduce managerial discretion and managerial benefits of 
control, such changes are only viable if they are accompanied by large increases in the value of 
managers’ equity claims. Managers are willing to initiate organizational form changes that involve a 
more restrictive organizational form or a more intensely monitored environment, only if the resulting 
reduction in managerial discretion is offset by large enough increases in the change in their wealth 
caused by the organizational form change. Large expected changes in managerial wealth are possible if 
                                                          
6 We define a finite REIT as one that is created with a finite lifetime in mind at the end of which the assets it owns 
are liquidated, and the cash is returned to the stockholders. 
the manager’s ownership of equity and the wealth effects of the organizational form change are large 
enough. Consequently, changes into a tighter organizational form or a more intensely monitored 
environment should be accompanied by a larger managerial ownership and a larger increase in equity 
value. This suggests the two hypotheses below: 
Hypothesis 1 (Effect of ownership). Firms with large managerial ownership of stocks and/ or options are 
more likely to change into a more restrictive organizational form structure. 
Hypothesis 2 (Changes into a tighter structure). Changes into a tighter organizational form should be 
accompanied by significant increases in equity value. 
To test these hypotheses, we categorize the different organizational forms by the restrictiveness of the 
corresponding contracts. We are able to map each different organizational form to its associated degree 
of managerial discretion. 
Now, consider organizational form changes where a firm moves into a looser structure. Such a 
move increases managerial discretion and, hence, potential agency costs. Therefore, changes only lead 
to an increase in firm value (and hence shareholder value) if these organizational form changes are 
accompanied by an increase in the degree of monitoring involved. Moving to a looser organizational 
form change could be accompanied by increased creditor monitoring and/or increased board 
monitoring of managers. The organizational form changes could also be motivated by the need for the 
additional flexibility required to restructure a debt contract and to reduce the cost of financial distress. 
Distressed firms have a higher gain in firm value due to reduced distressed costs. Moreover, distressed 
firms usually have a higher level of creditor monitoring, which reduces the agency costs that arise from 
the higher managerial discretion associated with a looser organizational form. In addition, distressed 
firms have lower levels of free cash flow, further decreasing the agency costs of a looser organizational 
form. Moreover, even among nondistressed firms, the agency costs of a looser organizational form 
decline in free cash flows (see Hypotheses 5 and 6 below). 
An alternative to creditor monitoring is monitoring by internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance, which can lead to managerial turnover for poor performance. In organizational form 
changes that include managerial replacement, there could be increased monitoring of managers and 
therefore lesser agency costs resulting from a looser organizational form structure (see Hypothesis 4 
below). 
Hypothesis 3 (Changes into looser structure with no change in monitoring). Organizational form changes 
to a looser structure should produce a negative wealth effect when the organizational form change is 
not accompanied by an increase in monitoring (creditor monitoring as indicated by financial distress and 
board monitoring as indicated by managerial replacement). 
Hypothesis 4 (Effect of creditor monitoring). Organizational form changes to a looser structure should 
produce higher wealth effects for distressed firms than for nondistressed firms. 
Hypothesis 5 (Effect of board monitoring). Organizational form changes to a looser structure should 
produce higher wealth effects when there is managerial replacement than when there is not. 
Hypothesis 6 (Effect of free cash flow). When nondistressed firms move into a looser organizational 
form, the wealth effects should decrease in the level of free cash flow in the firm at the time of the 
organizational form change. 
Sample Description, Methodology and Results 
We describe our sample in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we examine the degree of managerial 
alignment resulting from their compensation structure and its effect on organizational form changes. In 
Section 5.3, we examine the characteristics of firms (distressed or nondistressed) that move to a tighter 
structure and to a looser structure. We also examine the market reaction to the announcement of 
changes in organizational form. In Section 5.4, we further examine the wealth effects of changes in 
organizational form as a function of creditor and board monitoring. In Section 5.5, we consider whether 
changes in tax status may be driving the stock price reaction to organizational changes. 
Sample Description 
Our data consist of all publicly traded real estate companies that had at least one change in their 
organizational form during the period from January 1966 through December 1994. We also require that 
each company have information available on them on both the CRSP daily return and the COMPUSTAT 
quarterly databases for this period. A total of 134 organizational changes met these criteria.7 Twenty-
eight of these firms experienced more than one organizational change over our study period, first 
moving from a REIT to a business trust and then later shifting to a corporation. 
We obtained information on organizational restructurings from various issues of Audit Realty 
Stock Review, REIT Factbook and Moody’s Bank and Finance Manual, Volume 2. We use the Wall Street 
                                                          
7 Although the organizational form changes are spread over the entire 19-year period, about one-third of the 
changes occurred in 1975 and 1976. 
Journal, 10 Ks, SEC proxy statements and/or the PR Newswire to get dates of board of trustees/directors 
approval and shareholder approval for changes in organizational form. 
We used several criteria to classify our sample. First, we partitioned firms into nondistressed 
and distressed at the time of the organizational change by examining the Wall Street Journal Index for 
the 5-year period preceding a change in the firm’s organizational structure. We classified a firm as 
distressed if it incurred a net loss for each of the 3 years preceding the reorganization and if it reported 
at least one of the following adverse events during that 3-year period: 
a) the firm was in technical default on a debt obligation; 
b) the firm was in actual default and had filed for bankruptcy protection either under 
Chapter 10 or 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act; 
c) the firm had asked banks/public debt holders to swap properties in exchange for debt 
forgiveness; 
d) creditors refused to renegotiate existing credit agreements that the company stated 
were necessary for continued solvency; 
e) the firm indicated that they would omit dividends given that they previously paid 
dividends; and 
f) the firm reported that its auditor had given it a qualified opinion on the firm’s financial 
condition, e.g., going concern qualification. 
 
We define two variables to denote whether a firm is distressed or not. NDISTR is a dichotomous 
variable where 0 if healthy; 1 if distressed. We also define composite distress measure, CNDISTR, by 
adding up the events [(a) through (f)] listed above. This implies that CNDISTR can take on integer values 
from 0 to 6. This measure is constructed such that the larger values correspond to firms that are more 
distressed. Over 86% of the firms that met these criteria for distress were in actual or technical default 
in bond payments and were suffering severe financial difficulties. We also grouped our sample by firms 
moving to a looser or a tighter organizational form, as earlier in Section 3.2. 
Management Alignment and Organizational Changes 
In Table 1, we examine three measures of managerial alignment and the choice of 
organizational form change (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). First, we examine the insider holdings at these 
companies in the year of the organizational change, using the SEC insider filings made by these firms. 
Second, we look at the type of management compensation contract that firms had at the time of the 
organizational change. We collected information on the different components of compensation in the 
year of the organizational change for each firm in our sample. We gathered information on the value of 
stock options; managers’ salaries, including salaries received as board members; additional fees that 
insiders earned as property managers, advisers and real estate brokers and fees from other tie-in 
arrangements from the 8-Ks and proxy statements. Finally, we determined whether the management 
team itself changed at the time of the organizational change. We looked at whether the CEO or the 
management advisory team8 used by the firm was replaced in the year of the organizational change. 
Since information on all three of these variables was available for only 98 of the 134 
organizational changes in our sample, we report the results for only these firms in Table 1. The CEO was 
replaced in 18 of the 98 firms in our sample in the year of the change. The management advisory team 
was replaced in nine of the 98 firms that had advisory teams in the first place. 
From Table 1, we see that consistent with Hypothesis 1, firms that moved to a tighter structure 
have a median insider holding of 25.6% of the outstanding stock of the firm. In contrast, the median 
insider holdings at the firms that moved to a looser organizational form are only 2.51%. Although 
                                                          
8 REITs are organized either as advisor REITs or as self-advised REITs. In an advisor REIT, the advisory firm (as a 
separate entity distinct from the REIT) is responsible for managing the daily operations of the REIT and presenting 
investment opportunities to the board of directors of the REIT. There are no restrictions on who may act as a REIT 
adviser. Officers of the company that organized (sponsored) the REIT generally serve as officers of both the 
sponsor and also the advisory firm. The advisor is compensated according to an advisory contract that is typically 1 
year in length. The contract is renewed annually at the discretion of the REIT’s board of directors. Prior to 1986, all 
REITs were externally advised. 
moving into a tighter structure reduces managerial discretion, managers are motivated to initiate such 
changes because of the favorable effect on their wealth that results from increases in the value of their 
large equity holdings. Since their median holdings are 25.6%, if the stock price increases when the 
organizational form changes to a tighter structure, the anticipated wealth increases could motivate 
managers to undertake such changes. Table 2 shows that increases in equity value that result from 
changes to a tighter structure do in fact occur. 
 
 
In Table 1, panel 2, we present further evidence that managers of firms moving to a tighter 
structure trade off their managerial discretion for increased wealth effects. They tend to be paid more, 
and they receive a much greater proportion of their compensation from management warrants 
(23.47%). Thus, management experiences increased wealth effects from stock ownership. There is 
always the possibility that what we might be capturing in these tables is a preselection bias. For 
instance, if firms with looser (tighter) structures have higher (lower) equity ownership and 
compensation to begin with, one would expect the results to match what we find in panel 2. To control 
for this, we looked at the insider ownership at all REITs and real estate corporations in 1994.9 Insiders 
held more stock in REITs (which are tighter structures) than in real estate corporations in that year, and 
we believe that this pattern will hold through each year of our sample. This would suggest that 
preselection bias is not the explanatory factor for our findings. 
In Table 1, panel 3, we find that almost a quarter of the firms, which are in distress and are 
moving to a looser structure, replace their CEOs. Even among healthy firms moving to a looser structure, 
one in 10 CEOs are replaced. It is also striking that none of the replacements are voluntary.10 In contrast, 
there is almost no turnover at the firms that move to a tighter structure. This evidence is consistent with 
the view that a tighter organizational form and board monitoring of managers are alternative ways of 
keeping managerial discretion in check. 
These findings provide some information on what motivates managers at the time of an 
organizational change. Firms that move to a tighter structure seem to have the greatest alignment of 
interests between managers and stockholders because managers have large equity ownership.11 This 
makes shareholder wealth maximization a primary motivation for managers who are initiating 
organizational form changes. 
For firms moving to a looser structure, the relatively low insider holdings and compensation 
systems unrelated to stock prices suggest that there is a significant potential for conflicts of interests 
between managers and stockholders. In these cases, the increased managerial discretion and, hence, 
their private benefits of control could be a strong component of managerial motivation. 
In some cases, stockholders seem to have increased the intensity of managerial monitoring to 
curtail increased managerial discretion available in the looser organizational form. The managerial 
turnover increased by 17% at the time of the organizational change. For the subsample of distressed 
firms moving into a looser organizational form, increased replacement of managers can also arise from 
                                                          
9 The data on insider holdings were obtained from value line in that year. 
10 The news stories at the time of the replacement were perused for indications of whether the departure was 
voluntary or forced. We found that all managerial replacements are forced. We thank the referee for suggesting to 
check whether the managerial replacements are forced or voluntary. 
11 Following the referee’s advice, we considered the alternate possibility that the managers in firms having a looser 
(tighter) organizational structure have a higher (lower) equity ownership. If this had been the case, then managers 
of firms moving from a looser to a tighter structure appear to have higher ownership. However, we check for this 
possibility directly by comparing the average insider ownership levels at REITs (tight organizational structure) and 
real estate corporations (loose organizational structure) in 1993. We find that the average insider holdings at REITs 
are significantly higher than insider holdings at real estate corporations. While this is 1 year of the sample, the 
results (we believe) should be general. 
creditor control and monitoring.12 Consistent with this, changes into a looser organizational form are 
accompanied by a managerial turnover of 23.53% for the subsample of distressed firms. This percentage 
is significantly higher than that for nondistressed firms. 
Market Reaction to Organizational Changes 
We study the market reaction to announcements of changes in organizational form in several 
different ways. We examine the announcement effect for both types of organizational form changes. 
We also examine the announcement effect for the subsamples of distressed and nondistressed firms. 
For firms that move to a looser structure, we examine the announcement effects for subsamples 
categorized by the intensity of creditor and board monitoring. These subsamples are based on whether 
the firm is distressed or not at the time of organizational form change and whether or not there is 
managerial turnover at the time of the organizational form change. 
Studying the wealth effects of these organizational form changes is important for several 
reasons. First, we see whether these changes convey information to financial markets about future cash 
flows and growth. Second and more important, we see whether these decisions create increases in 
shareholder value. Whether the wealth effects of the different categories of organizational form 
changes are positive or negative is important for interpreting managerial motivations and the trade-off 
between shareholder wealth and managerial discretion. 
The hypothesis that we test relates this trade-off to the type of organizational form change and 
the concurrent change in the intensity of monitoring of managers. For example, if managerial discretion 
decreases for a particular subsample of organizational form changes either from moving into a tighter 
organizational form or because of increased monitoring by the board and/or creditors, we expect the 
announcement effect of the organizational form change to be positive. The resulting change in 
managerial wealth given the manager’s equity holdings could offset the decrease in managerial 
discretion. If the wealth effects of a particular group of organizational form change are negative, then 
the management has initiated such changes only if there is an offsetting increase in private benefits of 
control expected from the organizational form change. 
The sequence for an organizational change to a looser structure is as follows. The board 
approves the change in organizational form subject to receiving the necessary approvals from the firm’s 
                                                          
12 We thank Rene´ Stulz for suggesting creditor control and increased creditor monitoring as an explanatory factor 
for the organizational form changes among the distressed firms. 
creditor banks, noteholders and shareholders. Next, the creditor banks and bondholders vote on the 
proposed reorganization of the firm. Finally, the shareholders vote on the proposed change. 
For our sample of firms, there was not a single instance where bondholders or stockholders 
overruled the board of directors. If the change is to a tighter structure, only board approval is required. 
Therefore, information about the board’s approval is the earliest announcement13 of the organizational 
change. The stockholders’ consent represents the second (and later) announcement of the same 
change. 
To keep the analysis clean, we checked the announcements of organizational changes for other 
simultaneous announcements. We eliminated from the sample any announcements that were 
contaminated by other information. 
We examine the market reaction to both events, using event-study methodology. First, we 
obtain the dates of the board approval and the shareholder approval of the organizational changes from 
the Wall Street Journal (for some of the firms in the sample, the date of board approval was not 
available). Second, we estimate market model parameters using 200 trading days starting 220 trading 
days before the announcement date of the organizational change and ending 21 days before the date. 
Third, we estimate abnormal returns for each trading day starting 5 days before and ending 5 days after 
each event.14 
Fourth, we estimate the cross-sectional mean and standard error across the sample for each 
trading day and calculate the t-statistics. The results of the event study are summarized in Table 2 for 
the overall sample and for the subsamples indicated in the table. 
There is a positive and statistically significant reaction to the announcements of board approvals 
for organizational changes for all the groups—nondistressed firms that move to either a looser or a 
tighter structure and distressed firms moving to a looser structure. This result holds whether we look at 
the day of the announcement, the immediate 3-day announcement period (Days -1 to 1) or the entire 
11-day window (Days -5 to +5). There is a mixed effect following the later announcement of shareholder 
approval. Only troubled firms report statistically significant positive returns either on the announcement 
day itself or over the announcement period. 
                                                          
13 The earliest Wall Street Journal announcement dates for firms in our sample are all board approval dates. Thus, 
it can be viewed as the earliest news release relating to the organizational change. 
14 Although the abnormal returns reported in the tables are based on the market model, we also estimated 
abnormal returns without the alpha (Rj-hj Rm) and without adjusting for risk (Rj-Rm). The results were similar. 
Thus, the initial announcements of pending organizational changes seem to generate positive 
stock price reaction15 whether the shift is to a tighter or a looser structure, but the later announcements 
of shareholder approval generate few significant price reactions. The abnormal returns around the 
shareholder approval date are not significant for either the whole sample or any of the groups. The 
wealth effects of organizational form changes for firms that move to the tighter structure are positive 
and significant. The wealth effects of firms that move to a looser structure are greater (4.23%) for 
distressed firms than for nondistressed firms (1.97%). Although the difference is in the right direction, it 
is only significant at the 10% level.16 
The evidence indicates that stockholders anticipate, at least at the time of the organizational 
change, that the change will lead to higher cash flows in the future notwithstanding the private benefits 
accruing to managers, and that the improvement will be much greater for distressed firms than for 
nondistressed firms. Their expectation is largely borne out by the improvement in performance at firms 
that change organizational form, which is documented in Damodaran et al. (1997). 
Market Reaction and Intensity of Monitoring 
The evidence presented in Table 2 is consistent with managers implementing the organizational 
form changes to increase shareholder wealth, which in turn is a part of their compensation package. 
However, the positive wealth effects of changes into a looser structure warrant closer study. We know 
that managers increase their discretion by moving into the looser organizational structure, which can 
have negative wealth effects with no increase in the intensity of monitoring. As a proxy for board 
monitoring, we collect information on whether or not the CEO was replaced in the period around of the 
organizational change, which we define to be the year before and the year after. We divide the sample 
of firms that move to a looser organizational form into two subsamples based on whether or not there 
was a CEO turnover.17 We then look at the stock price performance for each of the groups, using the 
same methodology we used in Table 2. 
We would expect the wealth effects of moving to a looser organizational form to be most 
negative for the subgroup of firms which are not financially distressed and for which there is no 
                                                          
15 A potential selection bias associated with the traditional event study methodology has been explored by 
Malatesta and Thompson (1985), Eckbo et al. (1990) and Acharya (1988, 1993). We applied the Acharya correction 
to the abnormal returns and arrived at bias-adjusted returns that were slightly smaller but similar in sign and 
statistical significance. The bias adjusted returns are reported in Table 2. 
16 We use a one-sided test here given our hypothesis prediction of a higher wealth effect for the distressed 
subsample. 
17 We also analyzed firms that moved to a tighter structure. The smaller sample size and the relative homogeneity 
of these firms did not allow for much analysis. 
managerial replacement and most positive for the firms which are financial distressed and where 
managers are replaced. The evidence in Table 3 is consistent with this hypothesis. Nondistressed firms 
with no management changes have average announcement period returns that are mildly negative in 
the shorter window (-1 to +1) and mildly positive in the longer window (-5 to +5). 
Neither number is statistically significant. We also find that the average wealth effect for all 
organizational form changes to the looser structure is positive (2.47%) and significant. At the other 
extreme, the announcement day returns are most positive for distressed firms where the CEO is 
replaced, with an average excess return of 6.44% in the shorter window and 11.10% in the longer 
window. When we compare the wealth effects on the announcement of organizational form changes 
that are accompanied by managerial turnover to those without managerial turnover, we gain interesting 
insights. The abnormal returns are positive for both groups. However, the average for the 
announcement period is 7.16% for firms where the CEO is replaced, compared to only 1.14% for firms 
where the CEO is not replaced. This difference is statistically significant, as evidenced in the t-statistics 
for both the 3-day and 11-day windows. This evidence supports Hypothesis 5. 
The evidence in Table 3 indicates the effect of creditor and board monitoring on the wealth 
effects of moving to a looser organizational form. Table 4 summarizes this evidence. Distressed firms 
that move to a looser organizational form and have concurrent managerial replacement could benefit 
from creditor and board monitoring. In this case, the increased managerial discretion associated with 
the looser organizational form is offset by intense monitoring by creditors and the board. Managerial 
ownership for this subgroup is 15.82%. The announcement effect for this subgroup of 11.1% is 
statistically significant. 
On the other hand, nondistressed firms that move to a looser organizational form without 
concurrent managerial replacement have insider ownership of 7.07% and announcement effects of 
0.91%. Both the managerial ownership and the wealth effects are significantly lower for this subgroup 
relative to the former subgroup. This evidence supports Hypothesis 3. 
Nondistressed firms that move to a looser organizational form and have concurrent managerial 
replacement receive increased monitoring by the board but no special monitoring by creditors. For this 
subgroup, the announcement effect is 3.22%, and it is smaller than that for the subgroup of distressed 
firms with managerial replacement. Although the sample sizes are small for both groups (only 12 firms 
in each group), the difference is still statistically significant. 
 
These results suggest that monitoring by creditors and the board is an important factor in the 
overall positive wealth effects associated with changes to a looser organizational form. Taken together, 
the evidence indicates that a restrictive organizational form and monitoring are two alternative ways of 
keeping managerial discretion in check and thereby curtailing agency costs. 
 
The announcement effect of organizational form changes into a looser form accompanied by 
managerial replacement is significantly larger (7.16%) than that without managerial replacement, as 
evidenced in the t-statistics for both the 3-day and 11-day windows. The differences in excess returns 
between nondistressed and distressed firms when the CEO is not replaced are only marginally significant 
and only for the 3-day window. This is consistent with the monitoring hypotheses (Hypotheses 4 and 5). 
The evidence regarding the effect of managerial replacement is further examined to see 
whether the market fully anticipates the managerial replacements that are made after the 
organizational form change. To do this, we categorize the firms with management changes into those 
where the change occurred in the year before the organizational form change and those where the 
change occurs in the year after the change and examine the announcement period (day -5 to +5) excess 
returns for the subsamples. The results are summarized in Table 5. 
While both samples are small, the difference between the two groups, shown in panel (A) of 
Table 5, is striking. Organizational form changes to a looser structure when preceded by a change in 
management earn an excess return of 15.60% over the 11-day period; the returns are more positive for 
distressed firms (19.03%) than for healthy firms (8.25%). For those firms where the management 
changes occur in the year after the organizational changes, the excess returns are negative for the 
healthy firms and only slightly positive for the distressed firms. In short, much of the positive excess 
return that we see in Table 3 for the entire sample is generated by the nine firms, where an 
organizational form change is preceded by a management change. 
 
Regression Results 
In addition to the evidence presented in Tables 1–5, we also investigated the hypothesized 
relationships using a series of regressions of the announcement effect of organizational form changes on 
proxies for the degree of monitoring, either by the creditors (as indicated by the degree of financial 
distress) or by the board (as indicated by the frequency of managerial replacement concurrent with the 
organizational form change). We also use the regressions to study how the announcement effect of 
moving into a looser organizational form is influenced by the level of free cash flows that the firm has at 
the time of the organizational form change. The precise definitions of the regression variables that we 
use are listed below: 
⋅ CUMRET—Cumulative returns over announcement period (Days _5 to +5) 
⋅ NDISTR—0 if healthy; 1 if distressed 
⋅ CNDISTR—n, if n of the distress criteria (a) to (f) applies 
⋅ FCF—percentage of free cash flow defined as (EBITDA in year before change)/(market 
value of equity+value of debt) 
⋅ NCEOCHG—0 if no CEO change; 1 if CEO replaced at time of change. 
Our hypotheses imply that changes into a looser organizational form would elicit wealth effects 
that are increasing in the intensity of monitoring by creditors or by the board and decreasing in the level 
of free cash flows available to management. Therefore, we examine different specifications of 
regressing CUMRET on the corresponding variables NDISTR (or CNDISTR), NCEOCHG and FCF (t-statistics 
are in brackets). While Table 5 provides us with a measure of the univariate relationships between 
CUMRET and the independent variables identified above, we ran multivariate regressions to examine 
whether the relationships above continue to hold after we control for the presence of other monitoring 
variables. 
 
The effect of financial distress on the wealth effects of organizational form change continues to 
hold when we control for the extent of free cash flow that is available to the management at the time of 
the organizational form change. The effect of financial distress continues to hold with reduced statistical 
significance when we control for the additional monitoring variable that is whether or not there is a 
forced replacement of the CEO at the time of the organizational form change. The high degree of 
correlation between financial distress (NDISTR) and forced replacement of the CEO (NCEOCHG) which is 
reported in Table 6 seems to lead to a reduction in the significance of the NDISTR variable. However, 
given that ours is a one-tailed test, the coefficient of NDISTR, i.e., 1.67, is still significant at the 5% 
level.18 
To explore the cumulative effect of two sources of monitoring, that is when both the firm is in 
financial distress, as well as when there is a forced managerial replacement, we ran the following 
specification: 
 
 
In this regression, the product variable NCEOCHG*NDISTR=1 only when both types of 
monitoring are present. The effect of this variable on the wealth effect is significant and positive. This is 
also consistent with the results from Table 3 of the high wealth effects in the cases where the firm was 
distressed, and there was a forced replacement of the manager during the time of the organizational 
form change. Adding the individual variables—NDISTR and NCEOCHG—to this regression yields the 
following result: 
                                                          
18 To test out the hypothesis that market capitalization would be reasonable proxy for information asymmetry, we 
added market capitalization to each of the regressions. Contrary to expectations, larger market cap companies 
have slightly more positive announcement period returns than smaller market cap companies, but the coefficient 
on market capitalization was only marginally significant in all the regressions. This may reflect the fact that even 
the largest firms in our sample would be considered small cap in the overall market. 
 
Thus, putting the interaction effects increases the effects of NDISTR and NCEOCHG on 
announcement period returns. The statistical significance of both variables also increases marginally as a 
consequence. 
To summarize, the wealth effects of organizational changes to a looser structure seems to be 
determined by the degree of monitoring in place after the change and the level of free cash flow 
available. The intensity of monitoring either by creditors or by the board restricts managerial discretion 
and reduces agency costs. On the other hand, the availability of free cash flow aggravates agency costs 
in a looser organizational structure. The evidence presented in the above regressions and earlier in 
Tables 2 and 3 seems consistent with such a view of the effects of managerial discretion, monitoring and 
free cash flow on agency costs. 
Taxes and Market Reaction to Organizational Changes 
There is one final confounding factor that we have to deal with in analyzing the market reaction 
to organizational changes and that is the change in tax status that occurs when a firm moves from being 
a REIT to a corporation. Since REITS are not taxed on their income, and corporations are subject to 
double taxation (when they pay dividends), you could argue that some of the positive reaction 
associated with shifting organizational form from a REIT to a corporation can be attributed to the 
change in tax status. We undertake two tests to determine whether the wealth effects are primarily 
driven by changes in the tax status. 
 We categorize the organizational form changes based upon whether there is a shift in 
tax status (as is the case with corporation to REIT) or not (as is often the case when you 
shift from MLP to REIT). We find that there is no significant difference in abnormal 
returns between these two groups. 
 We categorize firms that go from being corporations to REITs based upon whether they 
have taxable income at the time of the organizational change (in which case, they 
should be able to gain the tax benefits immediately) or reporting losses (in which case, 
the tax benefits should be much smaller). We find that there is no difference in 
abnormal returns between these groups. 
The results of the preceding tests suggest that our results are not primarily driven by changes in 
tax status due to these organizational form changes. We believe that, even if taxes do play a role, they 
seem to be a relatively small part of the wealth effects in these organizational form changes. 
Conclusions 
We study the relative importance of managerial discretion versus cash flow claims in motivating 
managers to initiate changes in organizational form. We formulate and test several hypotheses based on 
our view of what motivates managers. Organizational forms that differ in the degree of allowed 
managerial discretion provide us with an interesting setting to test our hypotheses on managerial 
motivation. 
We posit that managers will move into organizational forms or a monitoring environment that 
restricts their discretion only when their holdings of cash flow claims is sufficiently large. In these cases, 
reduction in managerial discretion is offset by an increase in the value of managers’ cash flow claims. 
We stratify our sample of organizational changes according to whether the change is to a looser 
or a tighter structure, whether or not the firm is in financial distress at the time of the change in 
organizational form and whether or not the incumbent management is replaced when the change takes 
place. We study managerial ownership and the wealth effects of organizational form changes for 
different subsets of changes formed by our stratification. 
First, we examine the characteristics of firms that move to tighter and looser structures. We 
examine the wealth effects at the time of board approvals of these organizational form changes. We 
study how the wealth effect is related to managerial ownership of stocks and warrants, the financial 
health of the firm, the level of free cash flow at the time of the change and whether or not management 
is replaced at the time of the change. 
We find that the firms that move to a tighter structure have much higher insider holding and 
much more stock-price-based compensation. This could explain why managers at these firms are willing 
to accept an organizational change that gives them less discretionary power. We also show that the 
wealth effects of these organizational form changes are positive and significant. 
Among changes to looser organizational form, we find that announcement effects are also 
positive. The announcement effect for distressed firms that move to a looser organizational form is 
somewhat larger than that of nondistressed firms. Although this difference is only marginally significant, 
this relation implies that the agency cost of managerial discretion in the looser organizational form is 
offset by increased creditor monitoring (consistent with Hypothesis 4). 
Among nondistressed firms that move to a looser organizational form, we expect the agency 
costs of managerial discretion to be lower with lower levels of free cash flow. We expect (Hypothesis 6) 
the wealth effects of a change into a looser organizational form to be declining in the level of free cash 
flow. We regress the announcement effect on the level of free cash flow and find that the coefficient of 
free cash flow is negative and significant. 
We examine board monitoring as another mechanism to mitigate the agency costs of 
managerial discretion. We show that the top management of firms moving to a looser structure is much 
more likely to be replaced at the time of the organizational change. We hypothesize (Hypothesis 5) that 
changes to a looser organizational form that are accompanied by managerial replacement will have a 
higher wealth effect than will changes without managerial replacement. The evidence indicates that the 
announcement effects of changes into a looser organizational form are positive and significantly higher 
than are those without managerial replacement. 
In summary, we find that organizational form changes generally create wealth for stockholders 
but only if stockholders feel protected. Firms that switch to a tighter structure have managerial and 
stockholder interests aligned through substantial insider ownership and stock-based compensation 
systems. The wealth effects for these switches are unambiguously positive. Firms that move to a looser 
structure can have much greater conflicts of interests between stockholders and managers. The degree 
of managerial monitoring either by creditors or by the board has significant explanatory power in 
determining the wealth effects. 
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